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LEON C. SMITH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ALFRED BROWN COMPANY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
12,399 
Appeal from Judgment the 
Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Utah County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge 
STATEMENT OF 
THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries sustained 
by plaintiff as a consequence of defendant's negli-
gence in failing to provide a safe place for plaintiff 
to work and defendant's failure to comply with 
general safety orders of the Utah Industrial Com-
m1ss1on. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The court granted defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant and against 
the plaintiff, no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks an order remanding the case to 
the trial court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Brown contracted with Brigham Young 
University for construction of a high rise dormitory 
kown as Deseret Towers Resident Hall V. Brown 
entered into a subcontract with Ashton Construction 
Company on December 30, 1968, wherein Ashton was 
to do certain masonary work (See subcontract agree-
ment RI69). Plaintiff, Leon C. Smith, age 49, and a 
mason since 1951, was employed by Ashton as a brick 
mason on the project. In the course of employment, 
Smith fell out of a sixth story window and was in-
jured. The window opening was not barricaded as 
required in the general safety orders of the Indus-
trial Commission of Utah (See safety provisions 
R-94). Smith testified in his deposition (R-108) that 
he was working on an interior partition wall and 
had constructed the wall up to the ceiling. He had to 
lay the last block by splitting it. He stepped down 
from the scaffold which was located on the safe side 
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of the interior wall and saw that the last block was 
not in proper position. He stepped up on the scaffold 
which was approximately two and one-half feet high 
and reset the block. He stepped backward the sec-
ond time off the scaffold in order to restrike an-
other wall when he stepped on an unknown object 
that rolled with him. He lost his balance and back 
peddled some eight feet to ten feet and thence 
through the window opening and fell six stories to 
the ground. 
Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on 
August 31, 1970, attaching thereto the affidavit of 
G. E. Knowlton (R-67) and the Subcontract Agree-
met (R-69). The Motion came on regularly for hear-
ing before the court on the 25th day of September, 
1970, and the court ordered the deposition of Leon 
C. Smith published whereupon Mr. Berry made a 
motion for summary judgment on the following oral 
grounds: (1) lack of negligence; (2) same employer; 
and (3) no duty was owed to the plaintiff (R-73). 
The court ordered counsel to file memorandum 
within ten days with the proviso that if the court 
was leaning in favor of the motion that the court 
would set the matter for further oral arguments. On 
December 18, 1970, the court set the matter for trial 
on May 3, 1971, with a jury (R-77). On December 28, 
1970, the court, on its own motion, set the matter for 
further oral arguments on the motion for summary 
judgment (R-76). Oral arguments were heard Jan-
uary 8, 1971, at which time counsel for plaintiff and 
defendant were instructed to direct their arguments 
to the matter of causation in particular, contribu-
tory negligence, and whether the failure of the de-
fendat to barricade the window could be the proxi-
mate cause of the injury and also the question of 
workmen's compensation (R-81). Even though the 
court called up the matter of further oral arguments, 
there was no record kept concerning the arguments. 
Arguments as to workmen's compensation were tab-
led and at the court's request, counseln addressed 
itself to the proposition posed by the court that 
plaintiff's contributory negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of the accident, that the defendant's neg-
ligence in failing to barricade the window was not 
the proximate cause of the accident and therefore, 
plaintiff was barred from recovery. The only evi-
dence before the court was a description of the acci-
dent by the plaintiff in his deposition and other at-
tached exhibits including the Subcontract Agree-
ment. 
The court rejected counsel's arguments that there 
was negligence on the part of the defendant for fail-
ing to barricade the windows as required by the 
safety regulations and that this ommission was a 
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proximate cause of the accident in that it could have 
prevented the accident which was a foreseeable oc-
currence and a reason for the Industrial Commis-
sion's safety order requiring barricades on windows 
to prevent exactly the tpye of accident which occur-
red. The court at the hearing did not rule on the case 
after hearing arguments but took the matter under 
advisement. On January 15, 1971, the court granted 
defendant's motion for summary judgment (R-82), 
and ruled on January 18, 1971, that plaintiff had no 
cause of action and granted summary judgment in 
favor of defendant and against plaintiff, dismissing 
the action with prejudice (R-78). 
Plaintiff moved the court to enter Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R-86) along with a 
Motion for New Trial (R-88) which defendant re-
sisted (R-83) and which motions the court denied 
(R-101). Plaintiff then took its appeal to this honor-
able court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT PRE-
P ARING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW. 
Because of the complex nature of this case and 
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the many issues involved, plaintiff requested by a 
motion to the trial court that it enter findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. The court refused to 
enter its findings of fact and conclusions of law 
even after such motion knowing nfull well that plain-
tiff had to appeal its decision and that counsel was 
not sure of the basis for the court's ruling. Thus, 
counsel is left in a puzzled state inasmuchas the 
basis for the court's granting of a general summary 
judgment is unknown. Counsel can only second guess 
the court in its findings and prepare its arguments 
to this court based upon what he thinks to be the 
basis of the court decided. This makes appellant's 
brief very difficult in that counsel must anticipate 
all reasons upon which the court may have based its 
decision. 
It is true that Rule 52 generally does not require 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on decisions 
under Rule 56, however, Rule 52 also has an excep-
tion which says: 
" ... or any other motion except as provided in 
Rule 41 (b)." 
Rule 41 (b) states: 
"If the court renders judgment on the merits 
against the plaintiff, the court shall make 
findings as provided in Rule 52 (a). Unless 
6 
the court in its order for dismissal otherwise 
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision 
and any dismisal not provided for in this 
rule other than a rule for lack of jurisdic-
tion or for improper venue, operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits." 
Plaintiff felt that the court in the above case even 
though it had not heard any testimony from wit-
nesses, and made a determination based upon the 
merits of the case which had the same effect on 
plaintiff as if the trial were held, testimony taken, 
and the court then dismissed the case, no cause of 
action. Plaintiff felt that by a motion to make find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law to aid in both the 
appeal, and the knowledge of the court's decision, 
that the court under Rule 41 ( d) was required to 
make the requested findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. 
A review of the Federal rule from which the Utah 
rule is modeled reveals that, 
"with respect to Rule 56, the 1946 Amend-
ment adopts the theory that a motion for 
summary judgment under Rule 56, only 
questions of law are presented and no find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law are nec-
essary. There is no necessity for findings of 
fact where facts are not at issue and sum-
mary judgment presupposes that there are 
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no triable issues of material fact. Although 
findings are not necessary on a motion for 
summary judgment, some district judges 
state in their opinions the reasons for their 
conclusions that there is no genuine factual 
issue in dispute or set forth facts which they 
regard as definitely established. At least 
one district court has by rule required the 
moveant to serve and file with his motion 
'proposed findings of fact and conclusions 
of law and proposed summary judgment'. 
Such proposed findings shall state the ma-
terial facts as to which the moving party 
contends there is no genuine issue.'' Moores 
Federal Practice, Vol. 6, Section 56.02 (11), 
p. 2047. 
The theory of no findings of fact because there 
are no facts at issue is clearly inadequate if facts 
are in issue and counsel does not know why the court 
rules as it does. In Winter Park Telephone Co. v .. 
Southern Bell Telephone and Teleg1·aph Co. 181 F2d, 
341, 14 FR Serv. 56 c.41, Case 2, the Fifth Circuit 
Court reversed a summary judgment for the plain-
tiff and remanded the case for the making of spec-
ific findings of fact and conclusions of law either 
from the facts in the record or from the trial of the 
issues in due course as the trial court may deem 
adviseable and stated where inconsistent hypotheses 
might rea~mnably be drawn and as to which the 
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minds of men might differ ... In so far as the court 
holds that, in the absence of a final submission of 
the case, by both parties, the court may draw fact 
inferences on a motion for summary judgment, it is 
in error." (Emphasis added) 
Plaintiff feels that the facts of the case were not 
before the court in a form that would allow the court 
to assume the facts were stipulated to or that both 
parties agreed to the facts. In fact, there are no 
documents before the trial court which outlined the 
facts for purposes of stipulating the facts nor was 
there a document wherein defendant set forth its 
specific grounds and reasons for its motion for sum-
may judgment. It is submitted that the failure of 
the court not to submit findings of fact and con-
clusions of law and in deciding the case without facts 
to which counsel had stipulated, was in error in this 
case for the reason that Leon C. Smith, the plain-
tiff, has not had his day in court, has not had an 
opportunity ot present evidence in his behalf, and 
the court refuses to tell him the basis upon which 
he is kept from his day in court which is at least a 
breach of the constitutional protections of due pro-
cess. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CALLING ON 
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DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON ITS OWN MOTION AND IN 
NOT ESTABLISHING A RECORD UPON WHICH 
AN INFORMED APPEAL CAN BE BROUGHT 
BEFORE THIS HONORABLE COURT. 
There is no place in the present record where the 
trial court has established and delineated the issues 
in the present case and the reasons for granting 
defendant's motion for summary judgment. It is 
evident that the motion for summary judgment does 
not give the grounds and reasons why judgment 
should be granted except to say that, "there is no 
genuine issue of fact and that under facts most fav-
orable to plaintiff, the defendant is entitled to judg-
ment in its favor." That statement is incorrect to 
begin with because plaintiff has never had the chance 
to present to the court the facts most favorable to 
him. 
The court had stated that it would call the motion 
for summary judgment on for additional oral argu-
ments only if it were inclined to grant the motion 
for summary judgment. If it is in fact true that the 
court was leaning toward granting the motion for 
summary judgment, it was incumbent upon the court 
to establish a record upon which an appeal could 
be made, including a transcript of the oral argu-
ments. It shoulrl also be remembered that at the time 
10 
the court was hearing defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment, the trial on the matter had been 
set following a pre-trial conference and plaintiff 
was preparing for that trial. 
Rule 56 ( c) has been interpreted not to allow the 
court to draw factual inferences in favor of the mov-
ing party. The moving party has the burden of clear-
ly establishing that there is no genuine issue of fact. 
While the existence of an important, difficult or 
complicated question of law is not a bar to a sum-
mary judgment, the record must be adequate for 
decision of the legal question presented by the motion 
for summary judgment. In Moores Federal Practices, 
Vol. 6, Sec. 56.16, p. 2447, there is an admonition to 
district judges that, 
"District courts should not, however, al-
low the summary judgment procedure to be 
used in such a manner that almost as much 
expense and effort is incurred in demonstrat-
ing that summary judgment should be de-
nied and that the case should go to trial as 
the expense and effort involved in the actual 
trial. And the record before the court must 
be adequate for decision of the legal issue 
presented by the motion for summary judg-
ment." 
It is submitted that plaintiff has had his case de-
cided against him on an inadequate record. There is 
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no showing of facts upon which to base a decision -
the issues have ot been specifically framed for de-
cision. There are complex issues involved and many 
disputed matters which require a trial with its direct 
and cross examination before the legal issues will 
be brought in to focus. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
For purposes of clarification, counsel will address 
himself to what he thinks are the three main issues 
of the case: Subsection A. will deal with contribu-
tory negligence which counsel believes is the basis 
of the court's decision; subsection B. will deal with 
the question of proximate cause which counsel feels 
influenced the court's decision; and subsection C. 
will deal with the question of Workmen's compensa-
tion which counsel does not feel the court reached 
and thus did not influence the court's decision, but 
which counsel will treat in the event the court did 
base its decision on workmen's compensation. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure has 
been interpreted many times by this court and the 
following caf;es establish guide lines to be followed. 
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The court in Welchman v. Wood, 9 U2d 25, 337 P2d 
410, stated, 
"Summary judgment is a drastic remedy 
and courts should be reluctant to deprive 
litigants of an opportunity to fully present 
their contentions upon a trial, and therefore, 
summary judgment should be granted only 
when under the facts viewed in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, he could not 
recover as a matter of law." 
The court stated in Young v. Felornia, 121 U 646, 
244 P2d 862, certiorari denied, 73 S. Ct. 186, 344 US 
886, 97 L. Ed. 685, 
"Where there is any genuine issue as to 
any material fact, motion for summary 
judgment should be denied." 
The court stated in Richards v. Anderson, 9 U2d 
17, 337 P2d 59 that, 
"Summary Judgment is a severe measure 
which courts should be reluctant to use and 
doubt should be resolved in favor of allowing 
a full trial in the case." 
To the same effect was Calder v. Siddoway, 8 U2d 
17 4, 330 P2d 494, 
"Where pleadings filed and representa-
tions made to a trial court at the hearing 
disputed plaintiff's claim sufficiently to 
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raise an issue of fact, plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment was properly denied." 
The court in Watkins v. Simonds, 11 U2d 46, 354 
P2d 852, said, 
"Summary judgment as a remedy should 
be granted with great caution." 
The cases of this type containing pronouncement 
on summary judgment are legion; however, the above 
cited decisions clearly limit the trial court in its 
granting of a summary judgment. Also it is estab-
lished that when a summary judgment is granted 
against a party, he is entitled to have the Trial Court 
and Supreme Court on review, consider all of the 
evidence and every inference fairly to be derived 
threfrom in a light most favorable to him. Richards 
v. Anderson, Supra. It has been further stated that 
on defendant's motion for summary judgment, plain-
tiff's contentions must be considered in light most 
favorable to his advantage and all doubts resolved 
in favor of permitting him to go to trial and only if, 
when the whole matter is so viewed, he could, never-
theless, establish no right to recovery, should motion 
be granted. Samms v. Eccles, 11 U2d 289. To the same 
effect is Foster v. Stead, 19 U2d 435, 432 P2d 60. 
Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harmon 17 U2d 420, 
413 P2d 807 and ·Thompson v. Ford Motor Company, 
395 P2cl 62, 16 U2cl 30. 
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The court has also held that a motion for summary 
judgment is in effect a demur to claim of plaintiff. 
Samms v. Eccles, Supra, also, Williams C. Moore 
and Company v. Sanchez, 6 U2d 309, 313 P2d 461. 
It is submitted that the trial court erred in grant-
ing summary judgment in that it decided the case 
when there were issues of fact and on wcihh reason-
able minds could disagree. For purposes of this ap-
peal, it is submitted that the plaintiffs complaint 
states a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Plaintiff alleges that the injuries sustained by him 
were a result of defendant's negligence and careless-
ness in failure to cover a wall opening which defend-
ant had a duty to barricade because of the general 
safety rules of the Utah Industrial Commission, 
promulgated for the protection of workers and had 
the defendant complied with the Industrial Com-
mission orer, the accident would not have occurred, 
and at the time of the plaintiff's injury, the defend-
ant had the exclusive control and management of 
the facilities where the plaintiff was working and 
that the accident causing the injuries suffered by 
plaintiff was one which would not ordinarily happen 
if the defendant had used proper care and control 
of the facilities. Thus, if the complaint taken as true, 
which is required by the cases above stated, the 
plaintiff has made out a prima facia case based upon 
15 
defendant's negligence. In answer to the complaint, 
the defendant said that the accident was caused by 
plaintiff's contributory negligence and later amend-
ed its answer to allege that workmen's compensation 
was the paintiff's sole remedy. 
The questions of defendant's negligence and work-
men's compensation both involve many questions of 
fact which could never be reconciled. For instance, 
the subcontract declares Ashton to be an independent 
contractor which is a major factor to consider in 
showing that Brown, the prime contractor is not the 
emplyer of Smith and that it is liable under third 
person liability as provided by statute. The effect of 
the safety regulations to show defendant's negli-
gence is also at issue. It must be assumed that the 
court's major premise for granting defendant' mo-
tion is contributory negligence since it was pleaded 
and the other questions are irreconcilably at issue. 
a. Contributory Negligence: 
Contributory negligence has long been regarded 
by the courts as a jury question. There are instances 
in which summary judgment has been granted where 
the facts were ot in dispute or were stipulated to 
and the law was applied as to contributory negli-
gence, however, the record in this case contains no 
evidence of there being any stipulation of fact, or 
16 
soable man which has long been the province of the 
jury was applied by the judge to the instant case; 
or did the court consider whether the plaintiff had 
ever stepped off a scaffold backwards, or whether he 
had tripped before, or whether he was conscious of 
th danger of the open window, or whether he should 
have stepped off on a different place on the scaffold 
because of the closeness of the window, or whther 
he thought it was safe to step off the scaffold at the 
particular place which was close to the window, or 
whether the duty of safety and care the employee 
owes himself is increased with the nearness to the 
window or how far from the window would one have 
to be before it would be considered safe for him to 
step off a scaffold. Also unanswered are the ques-
tions of what caused plaintiff to stumble, and 
whether stumbling off a scaffold is a common occur-
ence, and who left the debris on the floor which 
plaintiff stepped on, and whether the premises was 
a safe place to work by legal standards. 
Under the court's ruling, the stepping off of a 
scaffold backwards and the stumbling over a piece of 
debris and losing one's balance is always contribu-
tory egligence because the court must base summary 
judgment on the basis that reasonable minds could 
not hold otherwise. The cases cited hereinafter clear-
ly show that the standard of care required by a 
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indeed any testimony based upon the adversary sys-
tem of direct examination and cross examination con-
cerning the accidet and the facts upon which the 
question of contributory negligence could be raised. 
There is the deposition of the plaintiff whereby 
defendant's counsel through the interrogative pro-
cess of question and answer tries to elicit from Mr. 
Smith the facts of the accident itself. A reading of 
the deposition of the plaintiff (R-108) from page 24 
to page 46 reveals quickly that it is not clear exactly 
what happened and in fact, quite the opposite is ap-
parent, that the deposition, because of the question 
and answer type of testimony is inconsistent: for 
example, the plaintiff couid not have stepped off the 
north end of the scaffold as stated on page 30, line 13, 
and there is question as to exactly where the plain-
tiff stepped off of the scaffold and the direction in 
which he was facing, the distance from the window 
and whether Mr. Smith was on the safe side or dan· 
ger side of the interior wall; all of which questions 
are relevant to the question of contributory negli-
gence. 
It is submitted that the court assumed facts not 
properly in evidence and ruled that plaintiff was 
negligent as a matter of law for stepping off the 
scaffold backwards and to trip on something and lise 
his balance. One may ask jf the standard of the rea· 
17 
is the language of the court concerning negligence 
wherein, the court stated, 
"Unless the question of negligence is free 
from doubt, a court cannot pass upon it as a 
question of law, and if the court is in doubt 
whether reasonable men might arrive at 
different conclusions, then such doubt deter-
mines the question to be one of fact for the 
jury and not one of law for the court." (citing 
cases). 
In Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 3 U2d 
203, 282 P2d 304, an employee fell into a vat contain-
ing caustic soda while spring cleaning his employ-
er's truck on a concrete ramp. The court stated that, 
"Contributory negligence is a question for 
the jury unless all reasonable men could 
draw the same conclusions from the facts 
as they are shown." 
The court further stated, 
"A plaintiff will not be held to have been 
guilty of contributory negligence if it ap-
pears that he had no knowledge or means of 
knowledge of danger." 
The court submitted the question of contributory 
negligence to the jury. To the same effect are the 
cases of: Glen v. Gibbons and Reed Company, 1 U2d 
308, 265 P2d 1013, wherein the court said, 
20 
reasonable man is a matter for ·a jury to decide and 
must be based upon all of the facts and circumstances 
relative to the incident. The case of Allison v. Mc· 
Carthy, 106 U 278, 147 P2d 870, involved a railroad 
employee who was injured as a result of a collision 
between track cars, one of which he was riding on. 
The issue in the case was the alleged contributory 
negligence of the employee who allegedly violated 
certain safety rules. The court ruled that the question 
of contributory negligence and the question of the 
violation of a safety rule as negligece as a matter of 
law was a question for the jury based upon all the 
facts available. The court stated, 
"In order to be guilty of negligence as a 
matter of law, the evidence must be undis-
puted and the facts must not be conflicting 
and must clearly prove that persons alleged 
to be negligent acted in the manner in which 
a reasonably prudent person would not have 
acted under the circumstances, or that he 
failed to act in such a manner as a reason-
ably prudent person would have acted under 
the circumstances." 
Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 9 U2d 275, 
342 P2d 1094, (1959), involves a case in which a man 
was injured by an exploding cartridge and the con-
tributory negligence of the man in modifying the 
rifle. The importance of the case to the istant matter 
the information of Ellis, Hansen, and Breeze was a 
very different accident from that described by Leon 
C. Smith himself, in his deposition. It is submitted 
that the plaintiff should be given the opportunity to 
present his case through direct evidence as to what 
actually happened so that there would be no question 
as to the facts involved in the case. 
A plaintiff's right to recover is not affected by his 
having contributed to his injury unless he was in 
fault in so doing. Fault can be predicated upon the 
plaintiff's conduct only where such conduct was in 
violation of a duty on his part to exercise care. Con-
tributory negligence, it has been said by the courts, 
is the neglect of the duty imposed upon all men to 
observe ordinary care for their own safety. It is the 
doing of something that a person of ordinary pru-
dence would not do, or the failure to do something 
that a person of ordinary prudence would do under 
the circumstances, before one can be held to have 
been guilty of contributory negligence, the court 
must find that some specific act or omission did not 
meet the standards exacted by law." 38 Am Jur~ Neg-
ligence, Sec. 181, p. 858. (Emphasis added) 
The standard of care by which contributory neg-
ligence is to be measured is well set forth in 38 Am 
Jur, Negligence, Sec. 190, p. 866 wherein it states, 
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"Where more than one inference can be 
drawn as to what a reasoably prudent man 
would do under patricular circumstances, 
the question of contributory negligence is 
one for the jury.''; 
Moore v. Miles, 108 U 167, 158 P2d 676, states, 
"The question of contributory negligence 
is for the jury where different conclusions 
may be reasonably rawn by different minds 
from the same evidence."; 
and Y oshitaro Okuda v. Rose, 5 U2d 39, 96 P2d 287, 
where the court said. 
"Wherever there is uncertainty as to the 
existence of negligence or contributory neg-
ligence, the question is one of fact to be 
settled bya jury regardless of whether the 
uncertainty occurred because of conflict of 
evidence or because from the facts adduced, 
men might honestly draw different conclu-
sions." 
From the above cases. it is clear that the ques-
tion of contributory negligence as a matter of law is 
actually a question for the jury based upon all the 
evidence as to plaintiff's reasonable actions in light 
of his occupation and circumstances. A reading of 
the depositions of Leon C. Smith, Roy F. Breeze, 
Martell Ellis, Anthony Hansen and Paul Glen Ras· 
mussen, clearly show that the accident based upon 
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"The measure of care required by a person 
in the interest of his own safety is ordinary 
or reasonable care, according to the circum-
stances of the case. In other words, one must 
exercise the same degree of care for his own 
safety as is required of another who is under 
a duty to protect him against injury. No 
fault is properly to be imputed to a man for 
not doing what it would have been useless 
for him to have done. The fact alone that 
the plaintiff sustained an injury does not 
establish a want of care on the part of either 
him or the defendant. Contributory negli-
gence is to be determined not according to 
what the plaintiff or decedent might have 
done, but according to 'vhat a reasonable 
person would have done under the circum-
stances. Due care for one's own safety does 
not require the exercise of the highest pos-
sible degree of care, or the anticipation of 
events which while possible, are only slight-
ly probable ... if a person charged with 
contributory negligence is shown beyond the 
possibility of reasonable contradiction, to 
have exercised that degree of care for his 
own safety which persons of ordinary pru-
dence and like circumstances are accus-
tomed to use, it may be declared as a matter 
of law that he is not guilty of such negli-
gence. Ordinarily, however, the question 
whether the plaintiff has exercised ordinary 
and reasonable care is to be decided by the 
2:) 
jury." (Emphasis added). 
"Whether a question of contributory neg-
ligence is one of law for the court or of fact 
for the jury must be determined on the afcts 
of the particular case. Generally, however, 
the question of contributory negligence is 
for the jury to decide upon proper instruc-
tions. The question of contributory negli-
gence is for the jury when it arises upon a 
state of facts from which reasonable men 
fight draw different conclusions, either as 
to the facts or the conclusions or inferences 
to be drawn from the facts.'' 38 Am Jur, 
Negligence, Sec. 349, p. 1053. 
It is obvious that there will be many times in 
which a person stepping backward off of a scaffold 
will not be contributorily negligent, or many times 
in which a person stumbles on something which he 
does not see for which he will not be contributorily 
negligent. It is submitted that the duty of care owed 
plaintiff by himself would best be established by 
considering the custom of the industry and whether 
brick masons step backward off scaffolds and 
whether or not any of them have tripped and lost 
their balance in doing so. If it is established that 
there was no fault on the part of the plaintiff, Mr. 
Smith, in doing what he has done many times before, 
the question of the negligence of defendant in fail-
ing to barricade the window becomes important in 
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is made." (citing cases) 
It is clear that proximate cause can be an omission 
and defendant's failure to comply with the safety 
order and provide a safe place to work can be the 
basis of holding efendant liable in the event plaintiff 
is ot contributorily negligent. 
The following cases demonstrate that a violation 
of a safety standard such as failure to provide a 
safe place to work or failure to barricade windows 
as required by the safety regulations of the State 
Industrial Commission of Utah impose liability on 
the defendant for negligence to the extent that con-
tributory negligence as a defense is often barred or 
at least becomes a jury question. 
Among the numerous cases dealing with the ques-
tion of a person or corporation violating safety 
standards and being held liable for injuries sus-
tained is Butz v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 233 P2d 
332, where the court held that whether a railroad 
in the exercise of ordinary prudence and care should 
have reasonably foreseen the likelihood of injury 
and whether additional precautions should have been 
taken by the railroad to provide employee with a 
safe place to work were questions for the jury. In 
Stout v. Schll, 241 P2d 1109, the court stated, 
"It is the nondelegable duty of a master 
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that the barricade could have prevented the injury 
to Mr. Smith. 
B. Proximate Cause 
The issue of proximate cause was initially raised 
by the court in oral argument wherein the court 
posed the question and requested counsel to respond. 
The issue as the court saw it was to the effect that 
if plaintiff is contributorily negligent then defend-
ant's negligence cannot be the proximate cause of 
the accident. Counsel tried to persuade the court 
that an omission or failure to discharge a duty can 
be a proximate cause of an accident. It was argued 
that defendant could have prevented the accident if 
it had complied with its duty of safety and that fail· 
ure to do so was a proximate cause of the accident. 
The court rejected the argument with the contention 
that proximate cause was an affirmative act. 
Proximate cause is defined in 38 Am Jur, Negli· 
gence, Sec. 50, p. 695, as, 
"That act or omission which immediately 
causes or fails to prevent the injury; an act 
or omission occurring or concurring with 
another without which act or omission the 
injury would not have been inflicted; the 
cause which leads to produces or contributes 
to produces, or contributes directly to, the 
production of the injury of which complaint 
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to use ordinary care and prudence in pro-
viding his servants with a reasonably safe 
place in which to work, reasonably safe tools 
and appliances with which to work and rea-
sonably safe and competent fellow servants 
with whom to work; failure of any one or 
more such duties will render the master 
liable for damages approximately resulting 
from such failure (citing cases)." (Empha-
sis added.) 
Kelly v. Vogue, 153 P2d 277, involved injuries to 
an employee when she fell descending a stairway 
and the employer had violated a safety ordinance by 
failing to have the stairway provided with a hand-
rail. The jury concluded that the employer was 
guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause 
of the injury. The Empoyee had contended that the 
forward edge of the step gave way causing her to 
fall, and the employer contended that the risk that 
xisted in the use of the stairway was open and known 
to the employee. The question of employees con· 
tributory negligence was for the jury. 
In Powell v. Vracin, 310 P2d, 27, involved injuries 
sustained by defendant's baby sitter when attempt-
ig to retrieve dangerous object with which the child 
had been playing she used a wall opening designed 
for eventual use as a <loor, but which ha<l not yet been 
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provided with outside steps. The court ruled that 
the evidence would sustain findings of negligence 
and did not require finding as a matter of law that 
the baby sitter was contributorily negligent. 
Restatement of Torts, Section 483, provies that, 
"If defendant's neguigence consists in the 
violation of a statute enacted to protect a 
class of people from their liability to exercise 
self-protective care, a member of such class 
is not barred by his contributory negligence 
from bodily harm caused by a violation of 
such statute.'' 
The above cases are all in point to a facet of the 
instant case. The Kelly case is factually similar to 
the instant case and a the cases have pronouncements 
of the court as to the duty of the person or entity 
charged with the safety of the premises. In his 
case, the one charged with the duty of barricading 
the windows was the defendant, said duty being a 
nondelegable duty. Violation of safety regulations 
has the effect as shown in the Kelly case of abQl-
ishing common law defenses. It is submitted that the 
safety regulations in the instant case were violated 
and that defendant is negligent and that said negli-
gence abolishes the common law defense of contribu-
tory negligence or as stated in other cases makes 
plaintiff's contributory negligence a jury question. 
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It is clear that the question of proximate cause, 
contributory negligence and defendant's negligence 
are interrelated questions all of which depend on the 
facts of the case. The cass cited indicate there are 
fact situations wherein a jury of reasonable men 
have concluded that plaintiff could recover. It is 
submitted that these same cases would allow Leon 
C. Smith to recover in the instant case had not the 
court erroneously ruled that as a matter of law 
plaintiff is contributorily negligent and barred from 
recovery. 
If the court's reasoning on proximate cause were 
correct law, there would be no recovery for railroad 
crossing cases where the signals or other warning 
devices failed to work. The reason for safety regula· 
tions is to protect against forseeable injury. Cer· 
tainly, the reason for the safety regulation with 
which defendant failed to comply was for the pro· 
tection of workers so they would not fall out of the 
window. It is forseeable that without fault a work· 
man might stumble and lose his balance and for that 
reason the forseeable accident is avoided by barri-
cading the window so that it cannot happen. The 
court did not correctly consider forseeability and the 
effect of defendant's negligence as the proximate 
cause of the accident and erred in its decision grant· 
ing summary judgment. 
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C. Workmen's Compensation. 
The question of workmen's compensation was 
pleaded as an affirmative defense by defendant by 
way of amended complaint and was not discussed by 
the court during oral argument. Counsel believes 
that workmen's compensation was not the basis of 
the court's decision but will treat the subject in this 
brief on the assumption that since the issue was 
raised, it may have entered into the court's delibera-
tions. 
Under Utah Statute, it is clear that workmen's 
compensation is not always a workmen's exclusive 
remedy. U.C.A. 35-1-62, states that: 
"When any injury or death for compensa-
tion is payable under this title shall have 
been caused by the wrongful act or neglect 
of another person not in the same employ-
ment, the injured employee, or in case of 
death, his dependents, may claim compensa-
tion and the injured employee or his heirs 
or personal representative may also have an 
action for damages against such third per-
son." 
Unless defendant can show that plaintiff was in its 
"employment" defendant is liable for injuries it 
caused under the statute. 
The term "not in the same empoyment'' can best 
be interpreted in light of other statutes such as UCA 
35-1-42 which states: 
"When any employee procures any work 
to be done wholly or in part for him by a 
contractor over whose work he retains su-
pervisin or control and such work is a part 
or process in the trade or business of the 
employer, such contractor and all persons 
employed by him and all subcontractors 
under him, and all persons employed by any 
such subcontractors, shall be deemed within 
the meaning of this section, empoyees of 
such original employer." 
and UCA 35-1-42 goes on to say: 
"Any person, firm or corporation engaged 
in the performance of work as an independ-
ent contractor shall be deemed an employer 
within the meaning of this action." 
The statutes have the effect of making Ashton 
an independent contractor and for purposes of the 
act, the employer of Smith. There is a question of 
supervision and control, however, this question is 
laid to rest because of the agreement between Ashton 
and defendant Brown wherein paragraph eight en· 
titled "insurance" the relationship of the parties is 
clearly defined as to workmen's compensation as 
follows: 
"Subcontractor shall provide and maintain 
at all times during the performance of this 
subcontract the following insurance: (1) 
liability insurance for protection of sub-
contractor's employees ... All insurance re-
quired hereunder shall be maintained in full 
force and effect in a company or companies 
satisfactory to contractor, shall be maintain-
ed at subcontractor's expense until perform-
ance in full hereof ... " 
and in paragraph twelve the contract declares Ash-
ton to be an independent contractor and an employ-
ing unit as follows: 
"The subcontractor specifically agrees 
that he is, or prior to the start of work here-
under will become, an independent contractor 
and an employing unit as an employer, to all 
applicable unemployment compensation so as 
to relieve the contractor of any responsi-
bility or liability for treating subcontrac· 
tor's employees as employees of the contrac-
tor for the purpose of keeping records, mak-
ing reports and payment of unemployment 
compensation and workmen's compensation 
taxes or contributions . . . '' (Emphasis 
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added) 
Thus, it is crystal clear that by agreement, the 
defendant made Ashton an independent contractor 
and an employing unit for purposes of workmen's 
compensation. Thus, Ashton, becomes an employer 
under 35-1-42 of Utah Code Annotated. Defendant, 
by contract, is relieved from the responsibility of 
paying the premiums of its independent contractor 
Ashton and in the bargain loses immunity from suit 
given to workmen's compensation then exposing it· 
self to liabiity for its negligence under UCA 35-1-62. 
A review of the cases dealing with workmen's com· 
pensation is rendered somewhat moot in that the 
question to be determined in those cases is whether 
or not the employer is an independant contractor 
which question is decided in the instant case by con· 
tract. Representative of the cases are Stricker v. 
Industrial Commission, 55 U 603, 188 P 849, 19 ALR 
1156, distinguished in 63 U 221, 224 P 885; Angel v. 
Industrial Commission, 64 U 105 228 P 509; Bison v. 
Industrial Commission, 81 U 58, 21 P2d 536; Murch 
Brothers Construction Company v. Industrial Com· 
mission, 84 U 494, 36 P2d 1053; and Plewe Construe· 
tion Company v. Industrial Commission, 121 U 375, 
242 P2cl 561. The above cases would all support the 
proposition that Ashton is an independent contrac· 
tor. Almost all cases dealt 'vith whether a workman 
was covered under workmen's compensation. 
Workmen's compensation was based upon a mutual 
exchange of rights and liabilities between employers 
and employees. As applied to the instant case, work-
men's compensation, because of the quid pro quo 
concept and the mutual exchange of rights and liabil-
ities, bars plaintiff from suing Ashton, his employer, 
but does give him the right to sue Brown for Brown's 
negligence inasmuch as Brown did not pay any pre-
miums and in no way has contributed quid pro quo 
for immunity from suit. There could be no possible 
quid pro quo on Brown's part because of the agree-
ment with Ashton that Brown be released from all 
responsibility under workmen's compensation. 
It is submitted that Ashton, plaintiff's employer, 
is an independent contractor for purposes of work-
men's compensation and that the statutes of Utah are 
written for the mutual benefit of plaintiff and Ash-
ton for purposes of workmen's compensation. Ash-
ton has paid premiums and under a quid pro quo 
exchange of mutual rights and liabilities is entitled 
to immunity from suit by plaintiff for injuries in-
curre on the job. Defendant on the other hand, has 
paid no premiums, has specifically made Ashton an 
independent contractor for the purpose of relieving 
Brown from any responsibility and liability under 
workmen's compensation, and is not entitled to im-
munity under workmen's compensation statutes, but 
is subject to liability for its negligence under UCA 
35-1-62, which allows an injured empoyee to bring 
suit against third parties. 
CONCLUSION 
The court erred in granting defendant's motion for 
summary judgment in that it had to make factual 
inferences to make its decision which is a violation of 
Rule 56 which requires that there be no issues of fact 
left unresolved. The instant case involves many un-
resolved issues of fact. The law outlined above set 
forth guideines for ruling on a summary judgment 
and the question is a jury question. It is submitted 
that this plaintiff has not yet had his day in court 1 
and this plaintiff appeals to this honorable court! 
for an order remanding the case back to the trial i 
court for trial on the merits and the establishing of i 
an adequate record. The court further erred in not\ 
providing findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
which would have aided in the preparation of this: 
I 
brief. I 
I 
Plaintiff is entitled to a fair trial as provided by! 
the constitution and for that reason prays the court· 
to remand the case to the trial court for that purpose. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
'Jr: . )•) 
Jackson Howard 
